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The results of the summit in Prague recently changed Europe (and
the world) forever. The acceptance of seven new NATO members
and the agreement on full EU membership for ten additional
members has reshaped the old continent. The old post-Versailles
and post-Yalta political order is definitively over, and Europe is
moving toward De Gaulle’s then visionary idea of a Europe unit-
ed from the Atlantic to the Urals. Giscard d’Estaing is proposing
a future confederal structure, in which Europe would play a more
important role in global issues, and be united under common
ideals, visions, standards and laws in political life, economy,
human rights, freedom of movement, and education. Only one lit-
tle corner, one “enclave” (as Michael Steiner, UN representative in
Kosovo, has said), Europe’s “backyard”, the Balkans, remains
“pro futuro”, excluded from the process of Euro-Atlantic integra-
tion. Why? 
What are the prospects for countries considered part of the
“West Balkan region”? What must these “West Balkan countries”
do to become part of the European family ?
Croatia is strongly opposed to the “West Balkan” category, for
Croatia is a middle-European and Mediterranean country (based
on its history, tradition, culture, geopolitical position, and self-
determination). It is only the last seventy years of common history
with the peoples of former Yugoslavia that have made it a Balkan
country. 
Croatia, Bosnia-Herzegovina, Serbia, Macedonia,
Montenegro (that is, their politicians, businessmen, scientists, and
artists) try to explain the issues in historical terms, but such expla-
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nations are greeted with scorn or lack of understanding. European
politicians attempt to ignore our history, eradicate our differences,
and destroy our memory.  We, on the other hand, believe history
freed from ideology explains the past and liberates the future. 
European politicians consider this part of southeastern Europe
a natural unit, which is true for Croatia and Bosnia-Herzegovina;
the shape of the two countries says more than hours of historical
explanations.
“You use the same language, you can understand each
other” is a frequent comment. But language similarities do not
mean the language is the same.  (The Serbo-Croatian language
does not exist) There are vast differences that must be respected –
historical, cultural, religious.  Differences in opinion must be
accepted and valued (excluding chauvinism, hegemony, racism),
for through differences, acceptance and common ground can be
found.  Pressure and force are unacceptable.  Time must be
allowed for wounds to heal; the process of conciliation cannot be
imposed.
The West Balkan countries have been told that their individual
economies are small and inefficient, and that only as a big, inte-
grated region (i.e. former Yugoslavia) can they be successful in the
open market and a globalize world economy. For this reason, it
was argued, countries of the region must gradually come togeth-
er (joint custom unions, integrated power resources, roads,
pipelines), create better ties with neighbors (regional coopera-
tion), form supranational structures, and unite with each other
before entering into a larger entity such as the European Union.
Croatia is not opposed to better relations and economic and
cultural exchanges with its Balkan neighbors, but would prefer (as
expressed by the President of the State, President of the
Government, Minister for European Integration, and the general
public) an individual approach and assessment of achievements,
instead of a role the European Union wishes to impose upon
Croatia.
Croatia is not opposed to its neighbors; it is willing to devel-
op bilateral and multilateral ties with neighboring Balkan coun-
tries through the Stability Pact, the Stabilization and Association
Process (SAP), the “Adriatic initiative” (Macedonia, Albania,
Croatia, and the three countries which remain a part of the Vilnius
group) and others, but refuses to participate in the creation of the
“new-old” federal or confederal union of states, and to be part of
any future, supranational structure – be it West Balkans,
Yugoslavia, or South Slavia.
The European Union has a specific framework for the region’s
EU association.  There are three political conditions:
full and effective cooperation with the International Criminal
Court for the former Yugoslavia (ICTY); 24
effective implementation of a refugee return policy;
active policy against organized crime, corruption, and traf-
ficking in human beings, drugs and arms.
Non-compliance with the following conditions means that the
EU Council and Commission would refuse to move to a further
stage of SAP, or totally suspend financial assistance to any of the
five countries. ICTY can be used as a political tool; for example,
transforming individual responsibility for war crimes into an objec-
tive responsibility which can lead to serious political repercus-
sions.  This perspective equates the victim with the aggressor,
aggression becomes civil war, and Europe,  having done its best,
is relieved of responsibility for allowing barbarism in its own back-
yard.
Simplistic wishful thinking and unrealistic political ideas
imposed on the people of this region by European politicians has
led to a stalemate in Bosnia Herzegovina; status quo in Kosovo;
and political instability in Serbia and Montenegro.
The position of Realpolitik analysts such as Henry Kissinger,
who opposed the liberal, utopian views of politicians who have
been reshaping and experimenting for years with this part of
Europe, was recently reiterated by William Pfaff  (International
Herald Tribune, October 10, 2002: “Time to concede defeat in
Bosnia-Herzegovina “). Pfaff believes the policy of the internation-
al community in Bosnia-Herzegovina has failed (has been defeat-
ed) and must be reinterpreted, and that one more partition (divi-
sion) of Bosnia-Herzegovina would promote democratic values.
Realism demands such an option.
Many fear a restructuring of the former Yugoslavia, so the EU
has opted for the name West Balkans, which is intended to allay
the fear of a former association.  The Croatian journalist and
macro-economist, Ivo Jakovljevic, wrote in Novi List, (October
16, 2002) “....within a framework of regional cooperation, the
West Balkan countries of former Yugoslavia could again unite into
an association of countries (Yugoslavia, South Slavia, West
Balkan) under an international protectorate. They would become
colonies whose sovereignty lies in Washington and Brussels, and
in powerful banks, and telecommunications and media
firms....the strategic goal of the US is control and recomposition
of former Yugoslavia in order to maintain secure and free access
to the Caspian region and its oil corridors, and the Kurdish route
through Asia’s soft underbelly, and to utilize controlled chaos and
permanent crises as a geostrategic tool.”
Members of the European Stability Initiative-ESI, recently dis-
cussed  the topic “Assistance to the West Balkans, Cohesion, and
New European Borders: A call for reform of policy” (October 5,
2002).  It was argued there that imminent political and econom-
ical chaos looms large over the Balkans.  Especially precarious is25
the position of Bosnia-Herzegovina and Kosovo. Financial help
from CARDS would decrease within such a scenario, unemploy-
ment would soar, and voters would turn to the right.  Promises on
the democratization of the Balkans at the “Zagreb summit” were
hollow, for the gap between the EU and the West Balkan countries
will become even wider.  The responsibility lies in the failed poli-
cies of the EU.  ESI believes Croatia needs little time to adopt and
harmonize itself with European laws and standards.
We must confront the truth.  The international community has
placed Croatia in the West Balkans, and the main purpose of the
Hague Tribunal is to relativize the guilt of the aggressor. Europe
feels responsible for the crimes committed in the wars in former
Yugoslavia and wishes to place the burden on the opponents of
regional cooperation
The integration of the West Balkan countries into Europe and
the world is inevitable. Though September 11th had an impact on
the situation in Southeastern Europe,  Francis Fukuyama feels that
this terrorist blow did not initiate the beginning of a phase of his-
tory, but that it was only a pause in the process of globalization.
He believes that his prophecies from “The End of History” will still
be realized. The consequences for the West Balkan countries of
this act of terrorism are serious.  Issues of security have made
political and economic associations much more difficult to
achieve, and living standards have fallen.  Democratic develop-
ment and economic growth in the West Balkans are now being
monitored by many international organizations and programs. But
countries in the region act, as all other states, according to their
own interests in the following areas:
-  Relations with the US-EU, countries in transition (for
instance, Rumania, which has a strategic partnership with USA,
ICC), stance toward the “axis of evil”, Iraq conflict, and forbidden
trade relations with so-called “terrorist states”, are all dependent
upon issues of globalization and national interests; 
-  Relationship to EU and NATO. Countries in transition inter-
ested in entering the EU or NATO are in doubt as to which side to
take (that of the EU or the US);
-  Relationships toward Muslim and Arab countries (Bosnia-
Herzegovina, Turkey, Greece, Israel, Russia-Chechnya,
Macedonia – Albania - SR Yugoslavia - Kosovo, Moldova –
Transnjistria – Russia), are also dependent upon national interests;
-  Unresolved national issues depend upon one’s view of the
combatants.  Are they national liberation fighters or terrorists pre-
tending to be freedom fighters? 
These categories often overlap and can also be influenced by
pressure imposed by the US, EU, or NATO; one’s position toward26
membership in EU or NATO; open national or territorial issues,
i.e. the tempo of democratization in Macedonia, Albania, Kosovo,
Moldova, Chechnya; issues from the past regarding boundaries,
succession, property, and war victims (Croatia, Bosnia-
Herzegovina, Serbia, Kosovo); and terrorist activity (Kosovo,
Macedonia, BH, Chechnya, and Georgia).
On the eve of possible war with Iraq, the following must be
taken into consideration:
Increase in Arab-Muslim solidarity; 
Opposition to individual American action and questions
about the role of the UN (Russia, France, China); 
Preparation of Al Qa’ida for counterattacks; 
Israeli response to defend its existence; 
Human rights in the US and some European countries endan-
gered; 
Pressure from the US regarding the International Criminal
Court (ICC);
Misuse of the fight against terrorism in order to gain advan-
tage in territorial disputes; i.e., Macedonia, Chechnya,
Transnjistria;
Unresolved national problems (Kosovo, Moldova,
Macedonia, Kosovo, Chechnya, Georgia).
The struggle against terrorism, whether to support or oppose
war against Iraq, and relations toward the  US and ICC are
dependent on each country’s national interest assessment.
The future stability of the Balkan countries will be determined
by:
- Bosnia- Herzegovina issue; that is, whether there will be a
“Dayton Two”, a partition, or renewed dialogue between the three
constituent peoples, conducted without pressure or preconditions;
-Kosovo: will there be independence or expanded autonomy
within the Socialist Republic of Yugoslavia?;
-Macedonia.  Is it an oasis of peace or will there be a new
round of confrontations?
-the Albanian question.  Although the majority of Albanian
politicians (Conference in Lucerne, November 15-16th ) rejected
the idea of  a “Great Albania “, new militant organizations have
replaced the older ones.  The most recent was founded in Tirana,
(“United Albanian National Front”, with links to ANA);
-obstacles on the road to full democracy in Serbia-
Montenegro.  Nationalistic forces are still strong; even President
Koštunica talks of unification of Republika Srpska with Serbia
proper.
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Croatia is vitally interested in good relations with all its neigh-
bors, and especially with Bosnia-Herzegovina. Lack of stability in
these countries can spill over to Croatia. Instability in Serbia-
Montenegro, Kosovo, or Macedonia could jeopardize its political
and economical stability.
What are the prospects?
- the EU must understand and respect reality, provide more
economic assistance, and develop civil societies and democracy;
- there must be full regional cooperation - bilateral and mul-
tilateral -  free of any institutional preconditions (new associa-
tions), and based on individual state (national interests) of each
individual country;
- peace, security, ethnic tolerance, free market economy, and
European standards (acquis communitaire) must be instituted.
The prospects for Croatia depend upon several factors.
European standards and laws (harmonization) must be imple-
mented, full cooperation with the Hague Tribunal (individual
responsibility not objective) is necessary, and full privatization must
occur.   Infrastructure, globalization processes, and preservation
of national and cultural differences must also be addressed.
Relations with neighbors, democracy, civil society, and NGOs are
other issues. As Otto von Hapsburg, president of the Pan-
European Union, said recently at his 90th birthday celebration:
“......there are two challenges facing enlargement of the EU.  It
must negotiate with every possible candidate, and those with dif-
ferent views or opinions should not have the European door
slammed shut on them…Croatia is such an candidate, and
Europe is neglecting Croatia!” He advised Croatia to apply for full
EU membership in spite of differing views. 
Doris Pack expressed her position at a Hamburg conference
(“EU enlargement - is Croatia the next candidate for the EU?).
She said the EU has pursued an erroneous policy toward Croatia,
that suspension of the PHARE program in 1995 led Croatia into
isolation, leading to a slowdown in democracy, and that there was
no harmonization with the EU.  She called on the EU to consider
a new strategy for the region.
An upcoming conference in Solun would define future EU
steps towards the region. The document “Directions for strength-
ening EU coordination and communications in the West Balkans
between EU operatives on the ground” is replete with criticisms of
past methods; therefore, it appears that the EU is aware of its
faults and wrongdoings  in the Balkans. Hopefully, the EU will
rethink and redefine its future policy towards the West Balkan
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countries, allowing individual countries to enter the EU and NATO
on their own merits.
29
30
